

## Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACHT IMMEDIATE 7021

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 4821

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, IS, US  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN ON U.S.-ISRAELI  
RELATIONS AND BEGIN TRIP

SUMMARY:

I CONVEYED TO DAYAN SOME OF THE BACKGROUND  
TO THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 27, NOTING  
THAT FROM RECENT BEGIN AND DAYAN REMARKS WASHINGTON  
HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOI WAS REINTERPRETING 242.  
I ADDED THAT WASHINGTON IS MOST ANXIOUS FOR A SUCCESSFUL  
BEGIN VISIT AND THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPECTED BEGIN  
TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS. I NOTED THE  
URGENCY WE ATTACHED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND SAID  
THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA SOON  
AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT.

DAYAN THOUGHT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT  
UNFAIR; IT HAD MISREPRESENTED HIS REMARKS. IN FACT, HE HAS  
NO PRECONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS OR THEIR OUTCOME.  
HIS READINESS TO GO TO GENEVA MEANS THE SAME AS IT  
MEANT WHEN DECLARED BY THE MEIR AND RABIN GOVERNMENTS.  
HE ASSURED ME THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE JAVITS'  
SPEECH BEFOREHAND AND WANTED TO DISABUSE US OF ANY  
SUSPICION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLAYING FOR TIME. HIS

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GOVERNMENT AND HE PERSONALLY AGREE THAT NOW IS THE TIME  
TO MOVE FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THOUGH I EXPLAINED  
THE CONSTRAINTS THAT DICTATED A VANCE TRIP IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER BEGIN'S, DAYAN QUESTIONED ITS ADVISABILITY SO  
SOON AND INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR WASHINGTON AS  
A VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN FOREWARNED THAT HE  
CANNOT CALL A TOTAL MORATORIUM ON DISCUSSION HERE OF JUDEA

AND SAMARIA AND SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CANNOT DO LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES. I REPLIED THAT ANY NEW SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND URGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY BE AVOIDED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROSPECT.  
END SUMMARY

1. I MET WITH FONMIN DAYAN FOR AN EXTENDED COVERSATION JUNE 30 TO REVIEW RECENT EVENTS, CONVEY SOME IMPRESSIONS FROM MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON, AND DISCUSS THE BEGIN TRIP. IT WAS A FRANK AND FRIENDLY SESSION, THOUGH NOT WITHOUT MOMENTS OF CONSIDERABLE EMOTION ON DAYAN'S PART. HE REPORTED ON IT IN DETAIL TO BEGIN YESTERDAY MORNING IN EVRON'S PRESENCE. I WAS WITH BEGIN LATER AT LARGE LUNCHEON GIVEN IN MY HONOR BY ISRAEL-AMERICA FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY (WHERE BEGIN DELIVERED AN EXTRAORDINARILY ELOQUENT TRIBUTE TO THE UNITED STATES), AND BEGIN TOLD ME HE WAS VERY PLEASED BY THE REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DAYAN ABOUT OUR MEETING.

2. WE AGREED I WOULD SEE BEGIN ALONE NEXT WEEK, PROBABLY ON THURSDAY, JULY 7. ANY SPECIAL INTRUCTIONS FOR THAT MEETING SHOULD REACH ME BY COB HERE JULY 6.

3. I BEGAN CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN BY REVIEWING GENERAL SECRET

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WASHINGTON SCENE I ENCOUNTERED LAST WEEK, AND DESCRIBING WHAT I KNEW OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS STATEMENT OF JUNE 27. I SAID I HAD FOUND THE ATMOSPHERE ON ARRIVAL WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, TO HAVE BEEN POSITIVE. THERE HAD BEEN A CLEAR PREFERENCE TO AVOID FURTHER PUBLIC EXCHANGES WITH ISRAELI LEADERS ON SENSITIVE ISSUES UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S INITIAL SPEECH TO THE KNESSET HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED BY U.S. OFFICIALS. IT WAS VIEWED AS A STATESMANLIKE, DIGNIFIED ADDRESS. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, (THURSDAY) PRESS REPORTS BEGAN FILTERING IN ON SOME PUBLIC REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND ON DAYAN'S TALK TO FOREIGN MINISTRY EMPLOYEES. ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I SAID, CONCERN ABOUT THE TENOR OF A PROJECTED SPEECH BY SENATOR JAVITS BEGAN TO DEVELOP. ONCE THE TEXT BECAME AVAILABLE, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD BE ASKED TO COMMENT ON IT -- AND CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE WAS UNDER PREPARATION WHEN I LEFT WASHINGTON ON SATURDAY, JUNE 25.

4. I SAID THAT FROM APPARENTLY SOMEWHAT INACCURATE REPORTS OF BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S REMARKS, THE ADMINISTRATION

RECEIVED AN IMPRESSION THAT BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S WORDS TAKEN TOGETHER WERE IN EFFECT REINTERPRETING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IT WAS DECIDED THEREFORE IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTATE CLEARLY THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF 242 SO AS NOT TO MISLEAD ANYONE, AND THE RESTATEMENT WAS INCLUDED IN THE PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE JAVITS SPEECH.

5. I THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT EVERYONE IN WASHINGTON IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE A FRUITFUL, SUCCESSFUL VISIT. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE WARM AND HOSPITALITE IN WELCOMING THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WILL WANT TO HEAR BEGIN'S VIEWS, BUT HE WILL ALSO EXPECT BEGIN TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS, ON ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM, AN EXPECTATION I KNEW

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SECRETARY VANCE HAD ALREADY CLEARLY CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR DINITZ. (INTERESTINGLY, DAYAN INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE DINITZ HAD MENTIONED THIS.) THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO KNOW ISRAEL'S PRIORITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, AMONG THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS IN POST-Settlement PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIPS. THERE IS NO PREDISPOSITION IN WASHINGTON TO ASSUME THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WILL NOT WORK CLOSELY. BUT, I WENT ON, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN THINKING LONG AND HARD REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS AND BELIEVES IT IS VITAL THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD AN EARLY GENEVA CONFERENCE BE CONTINUOUS.

6. I THEN SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST SOON AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT -- PERHAPS ARRIVING IN THE AREA ABOUT JULY 28, FOR PERHAPS SEVEN TO TEN DAYS. HE HAD INFORMED DINITZ THAT HE WOULD COME TO ISRAEL FIRST. HIS PURPOSE OF COURSE WOULD BE TO TRY TO REFINE THE ELEMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR GENEVA.

7. I THEN SAID THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND CANDOR WHICH CHARACTERIZES U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS, I

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WANTED TO TELL DAYAN OF ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH I PERSONALLY  
SENSED WAS INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO MONDAY'S  
PRESS STATEMENT. I SAID IT WAS PURELY INTUITION, BUT  
THAT I BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE FELT HE WAS BEING  
CROWDED BY EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS; THAT BEGIN,  
DAYAN AND JAVITS HAD SOMEHOW COORDINATED THEIR MOVES AS  
AN OPENING SALVO IN MOUNTING A BROAD ATTACK ON THE  
ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY. DAYAN INTERJECTED  
TO DENY ABSOLUTELY ANY COORDINATION OR INDEED ANY FORE-  
KNOWLEDGE WHATEVER OF JAVITS SPEECH. I THEN REMARKED  
THAT I WAS VERY PLEASED AT THE LOW-KEY RESPONSE BY THE  
FOREIGN MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN, AND HOPED WE COULD NOW  
MOVE ON.

8. DAYAN BEGAN HIS REPLY TO MY INITIAL REMARKS BY  
UNDERLINING HIS REAL DISTRESS WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S  
STATEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT IT HAD BEEN UNFAIR; IT HAD  
PUT WORDS INTO HIS MOUTH. WHY DID WE NOT ASK IMMEDIATELY  
FOR A TEXT INSTEAD OF RELYING UPON PRESS REPORTS? WHAT  
HE DID SAY WAS THAT IF HE HAD TO MAKE A PROPOSAL, HE  
WOULD NOT SUGGEST DIVIDING THE AREA (WEST BANK) BUT THAT  
THE TWO PEOPLES SHOULD LEARN TO LIVE TOGHERHER. HE NEVER  
MENTIONED ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK BY ISRAEL, SAYING  
ONLY THAT HE OPPOSED ANNEXATION BY JORDAN. IN FACT,

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HE HAS NO PRECONDITIONS AS TO THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS.  
REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF 242: ON THE  
NIGHT THE GOVERNMENT WAS INVESTED DAYAN HAD SOUGHT OUT  
BEGIN ON THE FLOOR OF THE KNESSET TO TELL HIM THAT HE WAS  
GOING TO INFORM THE KNESSET THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT  
REGARDS 242 AND ALL UNDERTAKINGS BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS  
AS BINDING UPON IT. BEGIN AGREED TO DAYAM'S SAYING SO,  
AND THIS IS THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC, OFFICIAL POSITION.  
AS A MATTER OF FACT, DAYAN SAID, YADIN PLAINTIVELY ASKED  
IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH WHY BEGIN HAD NOT MADE THIS POINT  
IN HIS COALITION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DMC. DAYAN SAID  
THAT WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT MEANS BY BEING PREPARED TO GO

TO GENEVA IS THE SAME AS WHAT THE GOLDA MEIR AND RABIN GOVERNMENTS MEANT. DAYAN REPEATED THAT WHAT HAD ANNOYED HIM MOST ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT WAS OUR GOING AHEAD BEFORE OBTAINING PRIVATELY FROM HIM A CLARIFICATION OF HIS REMARKS, AND HE AGAIN INSISTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW BEFOREHAND OF THE JAVITS' SPEECH. DAYAN ADDED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC TERRITORY ISSUES WAS THE WAY TO NEGOTIATE.

9. DAYAN SAID THAT A VERY WELL-KNOWN PERSONALITY IN THE U.S. HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE MONDALE SPEECH AND THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD SPELL THE END OF ISRAEL. THIS PERSON FEARS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE DEPARTMENT DO NOT REALLY APPRECIATE THE DIRE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY. DAYAN NOTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT IS VAGUE ON PEACE AND ON GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL. IF THIS IS THE SHAPE OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS--FOR EXAMPLE, EQUAL DEMILITARIZED ZONES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER--IT WILL MEAN THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. DAYAN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT OR ANYONE IN THE

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DEPARTMENT WANTS THIS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL THIS HAD COME UP EVEN BEFORE BEGIN HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN WASHINGTON. (I INTERJECTED SEVERAL STRONG CAVEATS OF REASSURANCE ABOUT OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S ULTIMATE SECURITY, AND STRESSED THOSE PARTS OF THE MONDALE SPEECH AND THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT WHICH EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT.)

10. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT THREE ELEMENTS IN THE STATEMENT BOTHERED HIM: (A) BORDERS, (B) HOMELAND, AND (C) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I AGAIN SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO DRAWING BORDERS, THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT THE PARTIES, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING ISRAEL, WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE. DAYAN DEMURRED, SAYING THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD APPARENTLY BE DRAWN UP BY OTHERS, PLACED BEFORE THE ISRAELIS AND THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SIGN. THIS, HE HIMSELF, WOULD NOT DO. RE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, DAYAN SAID THAT THESE COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON.

11. AT THIS POINT, DAYAN SAID WITH CONSIDERABLE FORCE THAT HE WANTED TO DISABUSE US OF ANY SUSPICION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLAYING FOR TIME. IN DAYAN'S PERSONAL VIEW, THIS IS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAST 30 YEARS FOR OBTAINING AN AGREEMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE TOWARD PEACE AND NOT JUST GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF MOTION,

DAYAN SAID. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THIS, PARTLY BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT I HAD SAID TO VARIOUS OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON--THAT I BELIEVED THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO SHOW A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT ANOTHER VIEW SHARED BY THE U.S. AND ISRAEL IS THE DESIRE TO GO FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND NOT FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENTS. DAYAN SAID HE WOULD CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER THE U.S. EXPECTATION THAT HE BE VERY SPECIFIC

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IN HIS WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS. I SAID THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING CONCEPT IS NOT ONE THAT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT, THEN BEGIN SHOULD BE READY TO PROPOSE CONCRETE, REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES. WHAT THE U.S IS TRYING TO DO IS TO LAUNCH A PROCESS AND WE HOPE BEGIN WILL HAVE IDEAS OF HIS OWN TO GIVE IT MOMENTUM.

12. DAYAN THEN SAID HE HAD SOME QUESTION ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF A VANCE TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST RIGHT ON THE HEELS OF THE BEGIN VISIT. FROM HIS PAST EXPERIENCE, HE HAD FOUND A MORE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON, AND WONDERED IF THE

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NEXT PHASE MIGHT NOT BETTER BE THERE. OR IF A TRIP WERE HELD, WOULD NOT LATER IN THE SUMMER BE PREFERABLE. I LISTED THE FOLLOWING REASONS AS REQUIRING AN EARLY VANCE

TRIP: (A) THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS EXPECT TO HEAR SOMETHING SOON; (B) RAMADAN BEGINS IN MID-AUGUST; (C) VANCE MUST GO TO CHINA IN LATE AUGUST; AND (D) VANCE WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CHINA. THE VANCE TRIP HAS TO OCCUR IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST OR BE POSTPONED UNTIL OCTOBER; BY THEN THINGS IN THE AREA COULD WELL HAVE SOURED.

13. DAYAN THEN WONDERED HOW BEGIN COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SPECIFIC WITHOUT MILITARY STAFF AND OTHER EXPERTS ACCOMPANYING HIM. HE DREW THE CONTRAST WITH RABIN WHO WAS A TECHNICIAN AND COULD GO INTO SPECIFICS ON DEFENSE LINES AND TERRITORY WITHOUT REFERRING TO HIS STAFF. I SAID I WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT BEGIN HAD TO DRAW PRECISE LINES ON A MAP, BUT RATHER SHOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER RATHER PRECISE IDEAS WHAT HE MIGHT BE READY TO DO FOR REAL PEACE ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE WEST BANK. I SAID THAT OF COURSE MORE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS COULD OCCUR DURING THE VANCE TRIP. HOWEVER, THE MORE SPECIFIC BEGIN COULD BE, THE MORE PRODUCTIVE THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS WOULD BE. I ASSURED DAYAN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO TRAP BEGIN INTO TALKING ABOUT

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THINGS HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT. I THEN ASKED WHETHER BEGIN WOULD TAKE MOD OR FOREIGN MINISTRY PEOPLE WITH HIM. DAYAN REPLIED THAT THERE MIGHT BE ONE PERSON FROM THE DEFENSE MIRGAUYFK BUT OTHER THAN HIS TWO NEW PERSONAL ASSISTANTS AND EPPY EVRON, THERE IS NO ONE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT HE COULD AS YET TRUST (TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS). DAYAN NOTED THAT DINITZ WOULD PROVIDE THE CONTINUITY WITH PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT ALL PAST APPROACHES HAD BROUGHT US NOWHERE. IN THIS RESPECT, HE AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE NEED FOR A FRESH APPROACH.

14. DAYAN AGAIN RETURNED TO HIS WORRY ABOUT A VANCE TRIP SO SOON AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO WOULD FOLLOW UP ON VANCE IN KEEPING THE MOMENTUM GOING, PARTICULARLY WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. NOTING THAT HABIB AND ATHERTON WOULD ACCOMPANY VANCE, I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS THOUGHT BEING GIVEN TO SETTING UP SOME KIND OF TECHNICAL, PREPARATORY GROUP, PERHAPS IN WASHINGTON, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. BUT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY A VARIETY OF OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

15. AT THE END OF THIS LONG CONVERSATION, WE RETURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF CREATING THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE FOR THE BEGIN TRIP. I SAID THAT I WAS HONESTLY HOPEFUL ABOUT THE VISIT, PROVIDED MORE PUBLIC SPARRING CAN BE AVOIDED

IN THE DAYS AHEAD. I SAID THAT BOTH BEGIN AND CARTER  
WERE MEN OF DEEP CONVICTIONS, BUT THAT I THOUGHT  
THEIR PERSONAL RAPPORT SHOULD TURN OUT WELL. HOWEVER,  
BEGIN WILL HAVE TO BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND CARTER'S  
PERSPECTIVE ON THE TOTAL MIDDLE EAST PICTURE, AND ITS  
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS.

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16. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT HE HAD TO BE ABLE TO MENTION JUDEA AND SAMARIA IN PUBLIC WITHOUT HAVING "TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT THE UNITED STATES' REACTION," OR TO HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THIS IS HIS COUNTRY, AND JUDEA AND SAMARIA ARE VITAL AND CONSTANT TOPICS. HE SAID TOMORROW (JULY 1ST) FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WILL BE A MEETING CONCERNING NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. THIS SUBJECT HAS TO BE DISCUSSED. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE "ASHAMED" TO TALK ABOUT IT. THE SUBJECT COULD NOT BE PUT ON ICE. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT BECAUSE THE STAKES WERE SO HIGH I HOPED THAT BOTH TALK AND ACTION ON SETTLEMENT POLICY WOULD BE POSTPONED. THIS IS AN EXPLOSIVE SUBJECT. BEGIN SHOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE TOPIC WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND NOTHING MORE SHOULD HAPPEN UNTIL THAT CONVERSATION. DAYAN SAID THAT ON COMING TO POWER THIS GOVERNMENT FOUND EXTENSIVE SETTLEMENT PLANS DRAWN UP BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED WHETHER WASHINGTON THOUGHT IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT BEGIN NOT AT THE VERY LEAST TO CARRY OUT PLANS APPROVED UNDER RABIN/PERES. I SAID WE DID THINK A MORITORIUM ON SETTLEMENTS WAS NOT ONLY REALISTIC BUT ESSENTIAL. THERE ARE PROPER TIMES TO DO ANYTHING IN LIFE. I KNOW THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WANT NEGOTIATIONS; I WAS CONVINCED THAT MANY ARAB LEADERS WANT NEGOTIATIONS. EVERY NEW SETTLEMENT NOW WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TOWARD THIS END. I ADDED THAT WE BELIEVE BEGIN CAN POSTPONE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, JUST AS HE HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO WITHHOLD EXTENDING ISRAELI LAW TO THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS.

17. DAYAN ASKED, AND I PROMISED TO INQUIRE, WHETHER THERE NOW REMAIN FURTHER WASHINGTON QUESTIONS ON HIS POSITION OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT ALL COMMITMENTS OF PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS REMAIN VALID. EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE AND THERE ARE NO PRE-CONDITIONS AS TO TABLING PROPOSALS, OR, AND HE underscored THIS

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POINT, AS TO THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER ANYTHING; AND WE WILL TRULY CONSIDER ANYTHING. THIS IS NOT A SEMANTIC GAME, HE SAID. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DESIST FROM MAKING ITS OWN PROPOSALS. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ABOUT ONE PARTITION LINE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. I ASKED IF HE WAS REFERRING TO THE WEST BANK AND DAYAN REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY; THE OTHER AREAS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS.

18. FINALLY, RETURNING TO AN EARLIER SUBJECT, DAYAN SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT HE HAD ALWAYS FOUND IT EASIER TO NEGOTIATE IN WASHINGTON. WHENEVER U.S. REPRESENTATIVES HAD COME TO ISRAEL THEY SEEMED RESTRICTED IN THEIR LATITUDE AND UNDER THE PRESSURE OF TIME. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESS. IN ISRAEL IT IS UBIQUITOUS, CONSTANTLY NEEDLING FOR DETAILS. THIS SORT OF PRESSURE FROM THE PRESS IS NOT AS PERVASIVE IN WASHINGTON. DAYAN SUGGESTED THAT WE WITHHOLD OUR DECISION ON THE VANCE TRIP UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT.

19. DAYAN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO TELL THE PRESS UPON MY DEPARTURE. AT HIS SUGGESTION, WE AGREED THAT I WOULD MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, AND THAT THE AIR HAD BEEN CLEARED. I WOULD ADD THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE BEGIN VISIT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. I DID SO, AND DAYAN ADDED THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE MEETING.  
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